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WHO SPEAKS FOR THE INVESTOR? 
AN EVALUATION OF THE ASSAULT ON MERIT 
REGULATION 
Hugb H. Makenst 
Merit regulation is under attack from critics who allege that it 
unnecessarily delays or inhibits capital formation. The author 
draws on his experience as both a state and federal securities 
regulator and as a private securities practitioner to examine the 
scope ofmerit regulation, analyze the criticisms, :z£X lain why the 
quantitative studies of the regulatory system have ailed to prove 
its value, and recommend changes that would ead to a more 
ejfective administration of merit standards. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An issuer desiring to make a public offering of securities must con-
sider both federal and state statutes regulating the sale of securities. I 
Although the federal laws, administered by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC), are the most familiar form of regulation, 
state securities laws regulate both federally registered offerings and of-
ferings exempt from federal registration. Many state securities acts, 
sometimes referred to as blue sky laws,2 attempt to protect investors by 
requiring some issuers to demonstrate to state securities administrators 
the fairness of an investment opportunity before an offer or sale to the 
t B.S., Michigan Technological University, 1961; J.D., Northwestern University 
Law School, 1964; Partner, Warner, Norcross & Judd, Grand Rapids, Mich.; Pres-
ident, North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), 1976-
1977; Director, Michigan Corporation and Securities Bureau, 1972-1978; Trial At-
torney, Enforcement Division, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 1966-
1972. 
l. In adopting the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
Congress chose not to preempt the state securities laws and thereby established 
their concurrent jurisdiction. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, Title I, § 18,48 Stat. 
74,85 (current version at 15 U.S.c.A. § 77r (West 1981»; Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934, ch. 404, Title I, § 28, 48 Stat. 881,903 (current version at 15 U.S.c.A. 
§ 78bb (West 1981». 
2. The phrase "blue sky law" refers to the state statutes' purpose of protecting the 
investor from promoters who would sell stock in the blue sky itself. See Hall v. 
Gieger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917) ("speculative schemes which have no 
more basis than so many feet of blue sky"). 
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public can occur.3 
The basic distinction between the standards applied in federal and 
state securities registration is that the SEC is chiefly concerned with the 
full and timely disclosure of all material information, while many state 
laws, in addition to requiring disclosure, require that the offering meet 
certain standards of fairness. This fairness requirement, referred to as 
merit regulation, reflects very basic assumptions about the need to pro-
tect investors both from excessive investment risk and from self-serving 
behavior by promoters and other insiders.4 
This two-tier system of regulation has been criticized as serving no 
purpose other than to inhibit capital formation. 5 Other commentators 
have responded by emphasizing the state's responsibility to protect all 
investors within its jurisdiction, particularly unsophisticated investors.6 
The issue at the forefront of this debate is whether the benefits of merit 
regulation as a measure of investor protection outweigh the costs asso-
ciated with the requirements of merit regulation.7 This issue has be-
come perhaps the most controversial subject in the field of securities 
regulation, as several states have recently considered the modification, 
restriction, or elimination of merit regulation in their jurisdictions.8 
The debate, unfortunately, is grounded more on opinion than on 
fact. A complete analysis of the costs and benefits of merit regulation 
has yet to be made. This analysis is missing in part because the empiri-
cal data needed for a comprehensive study are so difficult to obtain.9 
The principal problem, however, is the lack of an appreciation of the 
many intangible, non-quantifiable benefits of merit regulation. Conse-
quently, past law review articles and books on merit regulation have 
had difficulty assessing its value. 10 
3. For a discussion on the historical origins of blue sky laws, see L. Loss & E. 
COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 5-13 (1958). 
4. For a thorough description and defense of these assumptions, see Tyler, More 
About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 899 (1982). 
5. See, e.g., J. MOFSKY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEW BUSINESS PROMOTIONS 
12,36-37 (1971); Bateman, State Securities Registration: An Unresolved Dilemma 
and a Suggestion/or the Federal Securities Code, 27 Sw. L.J. 759, 778 (1973); Sosin 
& Fein, The Landmark 1983 Amendments to the Illinois Securities Law, ILL. B.J., 
Dec. 1983, at 196. 
6. See, e.g., Hueni, Application of Merit Requirements in State Securities Regulation, 
15 WAYNE L. REV. 1417, 1444-45 (1969); Tyler, supra note 4, at 900, 935. 
7. See Mofsky & Tollison, Demerit in Merit Regulation, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 367, 370-
71 (1977) (criticizing quantitative analysis of merit regulation's benefits for failure 
to analyze cost factor). 
8. See Sargent, The Challenge to Merit Regulation-Part I, 12 SEC. REG. L.J. 276 
(1984) (surveying recent challenges to merit regulation). 
9. See infra notes 99-116 and accompanying text. 
10. It is impossible to write about merit regulation without some bias. Mine arises 
from experience as a member of the SEC enforcement division, as Director of the 
Michigan Corporation and Securities Bureau, as President of NASAA, and as a 
private practitioner. Although I believe there are substantial flaws in the state 
securities regulatory system, I advocate retaining the present structure until it is 
shown that it is an ineffective means of investor protection in light of its impact on 
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This article fills some of the gaps In the present debate by explain-
ing how merit regulation works, why it generates so much hostility, 
who it benefits, and how it can be improved. The central argument of 
this article is that under many circumstances merit regulation is a 
uniquely effective means of protecting the public investor that can be 
made even more effective through greater cooperation among the state 
administrators, the SEC, the securities bar, and the securities industry. 
Section II of this article defines the scope of merit regulation, with 
reference both to its range of application and its philosophical prem-
ises. Section III examines the current assaults in both the theoretical 
literature and the state legislatures on merit regulation's value as a sys-
tem of investor protection. This section identifies some of the practical 
problems that lay behind the challenges to merit regulation. These 
challenges have led to several attempts to quantify the benefits alleg-
edly provided by merit regulation. Section IV examines why these 
quantitative studies actually prove very little about merit regulation 
and merely reflect the need for a new approach to the problem. Section 
V outlines a new approach by explaining why some form of merit regu-
lation is needed, and explores how that need can be met through a 
greater cooperative effort among all of the parties affected by state se-
curities regulation. 
II. THE SCOPE OF MERIT REGULATION 
A. An Overview of the Merit Concept and Registration Process 
Although blue sky legislation varies from state to state; nearly all 
jurisdictions require the registration of securities. I I In addition, since a 
majority of states l2 have modeled their securities law on the Uniform 
Securities Act (Uniform Act),13 most state securities acts are quite simi-
lar, especially with respect to the procedural aspects of the registration 
process. 14 Not all state securities acts, however, permit the administra-
the securities market. Although critics of this article will be able to argue that its 
conclusions are unsupported by either empirical data or historical documentary 
evidence, my conclusions and impressions are firmly based on my experience in 
the field. 
11. The only jurisdiction that does not require some form of securities registration is 
the District of Columbia. See 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~~ 504-506 (Nov. 1980). 
12. Thirty-nine jurisdictions have substantially adopted the Uniform Securities Act 
(the Uniform Act) or parts thereof: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Con-
necticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mex-
ico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South Caro-
lina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming. It!. ~ 1503. For citations to these jurisdictions, see Newman, Municipal 
Securities and State Securities Laws: A New Look, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 558, 558-
59 n.3 (1984). 
13. UNIF. SEC. ACT §§ 201-419, 7A U.L.A. 567-698 (1978 & Supp. 1984). 
14. The typical state law provides for three types of registration: (I) registration by 
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tor to review the merits of an offering. 15 Administrators without merit 
authority are empowered to review registration statements only from a 
disclosure and antifraud perspective. 16 This distinction between merit 
and non-merit review standards is reflected in the Uniform Act, which 
defines several grounds for the denial of registration to a securities of-
fering,17 only one of which, section 306(a)(2)(F), incorporates merit 
standards. IS Furthermore, registration problems may arise in a merit 
jurisdiction for reasons unrelated to the state's merit standards. 19 
When a state applies merit regulation in its registration process, it 
is attempting to channel investment capital into offerings that will give 
investors a better chance to earn a return on their investment. The ex-
clusive goal of merit regulation, therefore, is a very specific form of 
investor protection. Recently, with the shift in emphasis to a more der-
egulatory environment, a trend has developed toward the realization 
that an administrator may have a dual obligation, involving both inves-
tor protection and consideration of the overall economic climate for 
business in determining the manner of application of the securities 
laws. 
The specific merit standard contained in the Uniform Act demon-
strates how this goal is sought to be achieved. Section 306(a)(2)(F) au-
thorizes the state administrator to deny registration if "the offering has 
been or would be made with unreasonable amounts of underwriters' 
and sellers' discounts, commissions, or other compensation, or promot-
notification (a type of short-form registration in offerings whose issuers meet du-
ration and earnings tests); (2) registration by coordination (for offerings pursuant 
to a registration statement under the 1933 Act); and (3) registration by qualifica-
tion (for all other offerings). See id §§ 302-04, 7A U.L.A. at 599-612. 
15. The following jurisdictions are generally regarded as exercising some form of 
merit regulation: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
District of Columbia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, 
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
For discussion of recent changes in this list, see Sargent, supra note 8. See 
also Empirical Research Project, Blue Sky Laws and State Takeover Statutes: New 
Importance for an Old Battleground, 7 J. CORP. L. 689, 803-11 (1982) (surveying 
current merit regulation standards and practices). 
16. Maryland is an example of a state with disclosure-only review powers. See Miller, 
A Prospectus on the Maryland Securities Act, 23 MD. L. REV. 289, 292 (1963) (con-
cluding that the Maryland statute "roughly approximates locally the coverage of 
the two principal federal securities laws"); Sargent, State Limited and Private Of-
fering Exemptions: The Maryland Experience in a National Perspective, 13 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 496, 515 (1984). Illinois has recently become a pure disclosure 
jurisdiction. See Sosin & Fein, supra note 5, at 196. 
17. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 306(a)(2)(A)-(I), 7A U.L.A. 620-21 (1978 & Supp. 1984). 
18. Id § 306(a)(2)(F), 7A U.L.A. at 621. 
19. For example, a filing may not be in reviewable condition because of inadequate 
preparation or counsel's ignorance of the securities laws. Furthermore, an offer-
ing may encounter difficulty in a merit state because of disclosure problems or 
because the transaction has fraudulent aspects. 
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ers' profits or participation, or unreasonable amounts or kinds of op-
tions."2o Other states go beyond such listings of specific merit criteria, 
and apply provisions authorizing the administrator to deny registration 
if the offering is not "fair, just and equitable."21 In essence, a blue sky 
statute may contain both a provision identifying specific merit concerns 
and a provision authorizing a broad consideration of fairness.22 
To an issuer who makes a securities offering, specific merit con-
cerns present a composite of substantive standards that must be met to 
offer securities in a particular state. The attorney attempting to comply 
with these standards for the first time, however, may be puzzled to 
learn that they often cover topics not specifically referenced in the 
state's equivalent of section 306(a)(2)(F). For example, a state may im-
pose very specific criteria relating to the competence of the issuer's 
management, the organization of the offering, sale through qualified 
persons, the use of the proceeds of the offering, limitations on the abil-
ity of the promoter to "cash-out" of an enterprise without the investor 
having a similar opportunity, and adequacy of the business plan in the 
prospectus.23 The brief merit criteria referenced in the statute, there-
fore, merely represent a portion of the requisite merit standards. In-
deed, most merit states will either by rule or informal policy apply 
much more specific merit standards. 
Perhaps the most familiar aspect of the merit regulation is its regu-
lation of corporate offerings, particularly equity offerings. Most merit 
states have specific rules relating to these offerings.24 There are some 
20. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 306(a)(2)(F), 7A U.L.A. 621 (1978). 
21. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1260(1) (1981); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 551.28(1)(e) 
(West 1983). 
22. For a discussion of the adoption of a specific rather than a general merit review 
standard in the Uniform Act, see L. Loss, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SE-
CURITIES ACT 83-85 (1976). 
23. An example of a detailed set of merit standards is the NASAA Statement of Pol-
icy Regarding Real Estate Programs. This document provides a detailed set of 
guidelines for state administrators who review these offerings in terms of these 
and other merit concerns. NASAA is the major organization of the securities 
agencies of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Canadian provinces, and 
Mexico. It has adopted and proposed guidelines and statements of policy for a 
broad variety of merit concerns. The NASAA real estate guidelines are applied 
by many merit jurisdictions through formal rules or on the basis of informal ad-
ministrative policy. For the text of these guidelines, as effective January 1. 1984, 
see I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~~ 5352-5379 (Apr. 28, 1984). 
For a discussion on state implementation of the NASAA real estate guide-
lines, see Subcommittee on Real Estate Programs, ABA State Regulation of Se-
curities Committee, Survey of State Implementation and Application of the 
Current NASAA Real Estate Guidelines (Apr. I, 1984) (copy on file at the Uni-
versity of Baltimore Law Review office). See infra notes 43-64 and accompanying 
text. 
24. See, e.g., IOWA ADMIN. CODE §§ 510-50.33 to 040, reprinted in IA BLUE SKY L. 
REP. (CCH) ~~ 25,434-25,440 (Aug. 1983); Mo. ADMIN. CODE §§ 30-52.050 to 
.080, reprinted in 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~~ 35,455-35,458 (June 1982); WIS. 
ADMIN. CODE §§ SEC 3.01-3.08, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~~ 
64,521-64,528 (June 1984). 
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national guidelines for merit review of various aspects of corporate eq-
uity offerings,25 but the different state rules or policies cover similar 
issues and are applied in generally the same manner. These merit stan-
dards have received fairly extensive treatment in the secondary litera-
ture and need not be summarized in detail here.26 
Merit regulation has a significant impact primarily on public cor-
porations in which insiders retain significant ownership or voting con-
trol. The effect of merit regulation on the problems created by the 
separation of ownership and control is seen most vividly in the restric-
tions on officer and director compensation. The states restrict this com-
pensation by objecting to excessive warrants and options,27 cheap 
stock,28 and loans to insiders.29 Some forms of compensation are cur-
tailed to ensure promoter commitment to the project, provide for an 
orderly secondary market, and increase the amount of capital actually 
going to the project.30 Anyone familiar with securities offerings would 
identify these as basic objectives that underwriters, investment advi-
sors, and attorneys should seek to achieve in structuring an offering for 
an issuing entity. Much of the quarrel with these objectives thus relates 
not to the propriety of the objectives but rather to the specific limita-
tions imposed in their name. 
Issuers whose offerings do not fit within merit constraints must 
either modify the terms of the offering or face denial of the application 
for registration.3l The customary procedure, however, is for the ad-
ministrator to negotiate with the registrant, a process that results in 
either registration or voluntary withdrawal of the application.32 
Most registrations, whether of corporate equity offerings or other 
types of offerings, are prepared with a recognition of potential blue sky 
problems, and appropriate advance planning has been applied to the 
25. See, e.g., NASAA Statement of Policy, Cheap Stock, I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 
~~ 5311-5314 (Apr. 23, 1983) (cheap stock is stock sold to a specified class of pro-
moters or other insiders at a price less than that at which the stock is offered to the 
public). 
26. See, e.g., Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit in the Merit Requirements?, 
1976 WIS. L. REV. 79, 87-107; Hueni, supra note 6, at 1421-40; Tyler, supra note 4, 
at 911-23. 
27. See NASAA Statement of Policy, Options and Warrants, I BLUE SKY L. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 5321 (Sept. 17, 1980). 
28. See supra note 25. 
29. See, e.g., WIS. ADMIN. CODE § SEC 3.16, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 
~ 64,536 (Dec. 1983). 
30. See Goodkind, supra note 26, at 90-95; Tyler, supra note 4, at 910-15. 
31. The application may be denied pursuant to the administrator's issuance of a stop 
order. VNIF. SEC. ACT § 306(a), 7A V.L.A. 620 (1978 & Supp. 1984). 
32. Denial of an application seldom occurs since a registrant will ordinarily withdraw 
an application once it becomes apparent that the administrator's merit (or other) 
concerns cannot be satisfied. See Bartell, Merit Regulation and Clearing Strategy, 
in STATE REGULATION OF CAPITAL FORMATION AND SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS 
315,333 (D. Goldwasser & H. Makens eds. 1983). 
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filing documents.33 Nonetheless, there still may be a confrontation 
with the administrator over the fairness of the offering. When this hap-
pens, the administrator has moved from the role of defender of certain 
basic and non-controversial standards to that of negotiator of the eco-
nomic terms of the transaction on behalf of the investor. If the under-
writer has done an in-depth due diligence review, and if counsel has 
carefully examined the potential blue sky implications of the terms of 
the offerings, this will ordinarily not create a problem, because counsel 
should be prepared to justify the apparently unfair provision to the 
administrator.34 
The administrator assumes the role of investor's advocate because 
the investor is not in a position to negotiate the terms of an offering on 
his own behalf35 and because the underwriter is often unable to negoti-
ate favorable terms for the investor without risk of losing the under-
writing.36 The administrator may initially assume, often correctly, that 
the lead underwriter will provide only a minimum level of due dili-
gence and fairness negotiation.3? Through application of the merit 
standards, the administrator seeks to establish a level of minimum fair-
ness to the investor. These standards attempt to ensure that sufficient 
funds are placed into a project to permit the success of the enterprise, to 
prevent self-dealing that would strip the enterprise of vital capital re-
sources, and to provide the investor with a means of self-help if the 
transaction fails because of managerial wrong-doing.38 
The administrator's merit review, however, usually accompanies a 
review of the quality of the registrant's disclosure. In fact, when a 
merit administrator provides comments on an offering, the comments 
are more likely to relate to the adequacy of disclosure than to merit 
issues. Because many states will review most offerings, the state admin-
istrators are often able to identify internal inconsistencies, missing in-
formation, and similar problems. Many of these disclosure comments 
relate to merit concerns. Specifically, the administrator may probe ex-
tensively for hidden compensation, conflicts and background informa-
tion relating to the issuer or its affiliates, and may require specific 
disclosure with respect to these typical merit concerns. Since the exam-
ination at the SEC does not always identify and resolve these 
problems,39 it is fair to say that the states fulfill an important role in the 
33. See id at 324-33 (useful guide to this planning). 
34. See id at 327-29. 
35. See infra text following note 135. 
36. See infra text accompanying notes 138-41. 
37. Id This problem is compounded when the lead underwriter is an affiliate of the 
issuer. 
38. See, e.g., NASAA Statement of Policy, Real Estate Programs, Section VII, 1 BLUE 
SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5358 (Apr. 28, 1984) (requiring real estate program to pro-
vide participants with voting rights, access to records, rights to call meetings, and 
certain consent powers). 
39. See Makens, A State Regulatory Perspective of the Report of the Advisory Commit-
tee on Corporate Disclosure to the SEC, 26 UCLA L. REV. 147, 159-61 (1978) 
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area of disclosure. 
Identification of these problems by an administrator in the course 
of a merit review may prove beneficial to the issuer as well as to the 
investor. Removal of either the appearance or the reality of over-
reaching, self-dealing, or conflict of interest often works to the advan-
tage of the issuer by preventing future dispute and litigation.40 Simi-
larly, a merit requirement of a system of communication with investors 
is likely to foster stable investor relations.41 Restraints on the dumping 
of cheap stock in the market are likely to keep the market for that se-
curity and other securities more reputable and hence more attractive to 
investors. The industry and the issuer, as well as the investor, benefit 
by these restraints. They should be self-imposed by the issuer, its coun-
sel, or the underwriter, but when they are not, they should be imposed 
by law. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of merit regulation is the secur-
ities industry's voluntary compliance with published rules and guide-
lines. Insofar as the premises underlying merit standards are valid, 
many companies include these protections without reference to the 
guidelines or rules because it is in their self-interest to do so. In con-
trast, other issuers will comply with merit standards only because they 
realize that without compliance they will face substantial problems in 
meeting blue sky requirements. The net result, however, is that many 
of the merit standards become industry standards, honed in a competi-
tive environment over time. The development of an industry standard 
has a dramatic effect on all offerings, public and private. In the real 
estate field, for example, the controversial offerings of the early 1970's, 
as modified in response to merit concerns, have become the models for 
most of today's offerings.42 The ripple effect of merit regulation thus 
goes far beyond culling out the fraudulent or weak offerings. This vital 
(SEC disclosure standards are not designed to require disclosure of the insider 
abuse problems targeted by merit regulation). This author has frequently heard 
complaints from state administrators that SEC examiners have not adequately 
inquired into or required specific disclosure of promoter compensation, conflicts 
of interest, or the proposed use of proceeds. These items are usually "material" 
from a disclosure as well as a merit standpoint. 
40. This intangible effect is virtually impossible to measure, but it should be consid-
ered one of the benefits of merit regulation. Unfortunately, both supporters and 
critics of merit regulation tend to ignore it, at least in their published works. 
41. See, e.g., NASAA Statement of Policy, Real Estate Programs, Section VIl.C, 1 
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5358 (Apr. 28, 1984); NASAA Statement of Policy, 
Oil and Gas, Section VIII.B, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5229 (Sept. 22, 1976) 
[hereinafter cited as NASAA Oil and Gas]. 
42. This is not to suggest, however, that the real estate syndication industry has been 
entirely satisfied with state merit regulation of real estate programs. See Securities 
Industries Association, SEC-NASAA Hearings on Federal-State Securities Regula-
tion, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 12, 1983) (statement of Alan J. Parisse) (urging 
more effective and cooperative regulation) (copy on file at the University of Balti-
more Law Review office). 
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element of merit regulation has been ignored by all of the 
commentators. 
B. A Case Study of How Merit Regulation Works: The NASAA Real 
Estate Guidelines 
Although each merit state has enacted regulations expressing the 
merit standards to be applied by the blue sky administrator, these indi-
vidual standards have not developed in a vacuum. Instead, the sources 
of state merit regulation are usually the guidelines and statements of 
policy developed by voluntary associations of state administrators. In 
the past, three separate organizations developed these policy guidelines 
and statements; today, only the North American Securities Administra-
tors Association (NASAA) remains active in this area.43 NASAA is an 
association composed of the securities administrators of the fifty states, 
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Canadian Provinces, and 
Mexico. In addition to providing a forum for joint action, its purposes 
are the development of uniform laws and policies and the coordination 
of enforcement activities.44 Although NASAA guidelines and state-
ments of policy do not bind its members, they provide a recommended 
direction for states to follow. The current NASAA real estate guide-
lines are a good example of how merit standards can be used to pro-
mote uniform standards for investor protection in a specific type of 
offering.45 
The NASAA guidelines require sponsors of real estate programs 
to have at least two years of experience in real estate development.46 
This requirement is designed to prevent inexperienced people from us-
ing public funds to learn the business of real estate development. This 
standard reflects the customary practice of most experienced securities 
attorneys, who would rarely consider taking an issue public with unsea-
soned promoters. These attorneys would instead recommend that the 
43. The organizations consisted ofNASAA, the Central States Administrators Coun-
cil (CSAC), and the Midwest Securities Commissioners Association (MSCA). To-
day CSAC functions primarily as an enforcement forum, and not as a source of 
merit guidelines or policy statements. MSCA was merged into NASAA in 1979, 
but some of its former members constitute the core of NASAA's merit regulation 
committee. Makens, Administration and Relationship with other Agencies, in 
MICHIGAN SECURITIES REGULATION 15, 22-23 (c. Moscow & H. Makens eds. 
1983). 
44. NASAA's major efforts in this direction have included the development of stan-
dardized forms, see I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~~ 5111-5121 (Jan. 1984), state-
ments of policy, see id ~~ 5151-5385 (Apr. 1984), and the Uniform Limited 
Offering Exemption (ULOE), see id ~ 5294 (Oct. 1983). 
45. Although these guidelines are technically designated a "Statement of Policy," they 
are usually referred to as guidelines. Consequently the two terms will be used 
interchangeably in this article. See Hildebrandt, Regulation 0/ Real Estate Securi-
ties, in BLUE SKY LAWS: STATE REGULATION OF SECURITIES 295-304 (J. Halprin 
& H. Makens eds. 1984) (refers throughout to NASAA real estate "guidelines"). 
46. NASAA Statement of Policy, Real Estate Programs, Section II.A, I BLUE SKY L. 
REP. (CCH) ~ 5353 (Sept. 21, 1983). 
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client consider either a private offering with a limited number of inves-
tors or a joint venture with experienced partners. Similarly, most repu-
table brokerage firms would not consider handling a real estate offering 
with inexperienced promoters. Nonetheless, to the extent some attor-
neys and brokerage firms do not exercise the self-restraint necessary to 
prevent these clients from promoting real estate offerings, the guide-
lines provide a necessary degree of investor protection. 
The guidelines also require real estate sponsors to meet certain net 
worth requirements.47 The basic requirement that a sponsor be able to 
meet the financial obligations of a public program is certainly a reason-
able method to ensure the general partner's financial commitment to 
the project. 
The real estate guidelines also establish suitability standards for 
investors.48 These standards vary with the nature of the programs. For 
example, a program with a tax shelter orientation will customarily re-
quire investors to have a substantial net worth and be in a tax bracket 
that will allow them to take advantage of the tax benefits provided by 
the program.49 As a practical matter, since many real estate syndica-
tions have a significant tax orientation, the net worth test applied by the 
Internal Revenue Code with respect to the safe harbor for partner-
ships50 have become the industry standard, and they comport with the 
NASAA guidelines. In contrast, the net worth and income suitability 
standards applied to real estate programs designed to produce income 
for the investor rather than to provide a tax shelter are substantially 
lower.51 
In addition to requiring the investor to meet suitability standards, 
the guidelines require the investor to make a certain minimum invest-
ment.52 The concept of minimum investment has been debated both 
within and without NASAA for several years. The minimum invest-
ment requirement perhaps can be best justified as a means of creating 
an incentive for the investor to read the prospectus carefully or to 
spend the amount needed for competent professional advice. The crit-
ics assail the concept as assuring a minimum loss. 
The heart of merit regulation through the real estate guidelines is 
the requirement that "[t]he total amount of consideration of all kinds 
which may be paid directly or indirectly to the sponsor or its affiliates 
shall be reasonable, considering all aspects of the syndication program 
and the investors."53 The guidelines also indicate the type of consider-
47. NASAA Statement of Policy, Real Estate Programs, Section II.B, 1 BLUE SKY L. 
REP. (CCH) ~ 5353 (Apr. 28, 1984) [hereinafter cited as NASAA Real Estate). 
48. Id at Section III, ~ 5354. 
49. Id at Section III.A. 
50. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (1967). 
51. NASAA Real Estate, supra note 47, Section III.B.4, ~ 5354. 
52. Id at Section III.D., ~ 5354. 
53. Id at Section IV.A.I., ~ 5355. 
1984) Merit Regulation 445 
ation that is customarily received in these real estate programs, 54 and to 
require that a substantial portion of the program's capital contributions 
be applied toward the investment in properties. 55 Except in very highly 
leveraged programs (a type not normally made available through pub-
lic offerings), it is reasonable to require that a substantial portion of the 
proceeds collected from investors be devoted to the actual purchase 
and development of the properties rather than in payment of fees to 
promoters. While definition of the appropriate percentage is certainly 
subject to debate, the concept that an investor's money is much more 
likely to yield a return if it is used to purchase property rather than to 
pay promoters seems unquestionable. There are perhaps some situa-
tions in which this requirement does not make absolute sense, such as 
when a promoter has obtained the property at an exceptionally good 
price or has negotiated unusually favorable financing, but these situa-
tions are relatively uncommon, especially in public programs. In my 
experience, most national programs meet or significantly exceed the 
guidelines' requirements for the use of proceeds. 
The equity interests in the program retained by the promoters are 
also closely regulated by the guidelines. The guidelines require the re-
ceipt of benefits from these promotional interests to be deferred until 
investors have received a certain return on their capital contributions.56 
Real estate brokerage commissions on resale of the property are also 
limited. 57 The guidelines permit payment of a property management 
fee, capped at different percentages for residential properties and for 
industrial and commercial properties.58 
The discussion above is only a brief explanation of the NASAA 
guidelines for real estate programs and is intended to illustrate the 
goals of merit regulation of these programs. 59 It is important to empha-
size, however, that the merit standards imposed by these guidelines 
were not arbitrarily selected or developed without careful attention to 
the realities of the industry and the marketplace. NASAA guidelines 
are traditionally developed through a committee designated for the 
purpose of studying a particular subject for guidelines. The committee 
prepares guidelines for public comment and subsequently presents 
them to the NASAA membership for vote on adoption.60 The stan-
dards for promoter compensation, for example, were based on exten-
54. Id at Section IV.A.l.a.-h. 
55. Id at Section IV.C.1.-2. 
56. Id at Section IV.E. 
57. Id at Section IV.F. 
58. Id at Section IV.G. 
59. For more detailed discussion, see Hildebrandt, supra note 45, at 304-11; Sargent & 
Pollitt, Introduction to State Securities Regulation (Blue Sky Law), ALI-ABA, EF-
FECT OF SECURITIES REGULATION ON REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 179 (1983). 
60. Beyond this basic sequence, however, NASAA has not followed any definite pro-
cedure for the drafting adoption of guidelines and statements of policy, and this 
has contributed substantially to the level of controversy that has surrounded some 
of the NASAA pronouncements. 
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sive testimony about the level of compensation ordinarily paid in the 
industry to promoters providing similar services.61 In addition, this 
area, perhaps more than any other, experiences extensive negotiation 
between administrators and sponsors about the application of the 
guidelines to particular transactions, and the requirements are fre-
quently modified to meet the needs of individual programs. 
Most aspects of the NASAA guidelines do not burden the affected 
class of issuers. For example, with respect to real estate programs, the 
NASAA guidelines have served not only as a basis for merit regulation 
but also as the basis for SEC review.62 In addition, the guidelines were 
first implemented at the time of the initial development of the real es-
tate syndication industry.63 As a result, many of the standards estab-
lished by these guidelines have become industry standards applied by 
the promoters regardless of the extent or kind of regulation to be ap-
plied to a particular offering.64 The development of these standards 
certainly has not hindered the dynamic growth of the real estate syndi-
cation industry, and probably has helped to ensure the stability and 
public confidence in this form of investment. The real estate guidelines 
have also promoted compliance with the SEC disclosure policies be-
cause they have had the effect of forcing a great number of private real 
estate offerings to change drastically the nature and extent of disclo-
sure, as well as the structure of offering and the promoter compensation 
structure. The prospectuses used in private real estate offerings of the 
early 1970's bear little resemblance to their counterparts today. Both 
the level of disclosure and the economics of these programs have been 
dramatically affected by merit regulation to the advantage of the 
investor. 
This type of regulation also works to the benefit of the industry. 
To the extent that the real estate syndication industry could have been 
61. This author was a member of the NASAA Committee that drafted the first real 
estate guidelines in 1976. 
62. A review of SEC Industry Guide 5: Preparation of Registration Statements Relat-
ing to Interests in Real Estate Limited Partnerships, printed in I FED. SEC. L. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 3829 (May 4, 1983), will show the congruence of SEC disclosure and 
NASAA merit concerns. 
63. See Kuklin, Corporate and Real Estate Relationships-"Through the Looking 
Glass," ALI-ABA,' EFFECT OF SECURITIES REGULATION ON REAL ESTATE 
TRANSACTIONS 17 (1983) (discussing the interrelation of securities law and real 
estate transactions in the syndicated offerings developed in the past fifteen years); 
see also Makens, supra note 39, at 151 ("The early tax shelter offerings were so 
excessive in front-end promoter's compensation that they would have been an 
embarrassment to Jesse James. It was merit regulation at the state level, not dis-
closure or market factors, which ended the excesses .... "). 
64. This is perhaps the inevitable result of the fact that syndicators simply had to 
comply with the merit requirements of administrators in major states such as Cali-
fornia, Illinois, Michigan, and Texas. For a description of how the same phenom-
enon is occuring in the context of another securities product (publicly traded 
limited partnerships), see Publicly Traded Limited Partnership: An Emerging Fi-
nancial Alternative to the Public Corporation, 39 Bus. LAW. 709, 714 (1984). 
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labeled as one in which promoter self-dealing is common, it would 
have lost stature as a legitimate investment vehicle. This problem has 
been largely avoided in national real estate programs. My belief is that 
the industry's phenomenal growth has benefited from merit regulation. 
This does not mean that all the guidelines promoted by NASAA 
represent the proper level of merit regulation needed in each state. At 
times, NASAA guidelines have been inappropriate and too heavily 
weighted in favor of what is perceived by administrators as investor 
protection. A current example of this problem is the handling of limi-
tations on the amount of cheap or lower priced stock that promoters 
. may retain in connection with new offerings.65 
Many states require this so-called "cheap stock" to be placed in 
escrow.66 In 1983, NASAA adopted "cheap stock guidelines"67 that 
represent an excessive use of merit authority. These guidelines require 
cancellation of the stock unless the issuer achieves certain earnings 
within specified periods, regardless of the performance of the market or 
industry in which the issuer operates or of any other external consider-
ations.68 NASAA is currently planning to revise these guidelines in the 
near future. 69 Although not without some flaws, the existing real estate 
guidelines offer a model of how effective guidelines can be developed 
in a manner consistent with NASAA's goal of investor protection. 
III. THE ASSAULT ON MERIT REGULATION 
In some states, merit regulation today is under siege. It was sub-
stantially eliminated in Illinois, one of the leading merit jurisdictions, 
by legislative action in 1983.70 A similar attempt to eliminate merit 
regulation in Texas was narrowly defeated,11 but significant reductions 
in its scope resulted from legislative changes in Wisconsin 72 and Iowa 73 
during 1983. Comparable changes have been considered and appar-
ently rejected in at least two other states, Arizona and Missouri.74 
65. For discussion of the issues associated with merit regulation of cheap stock, see 
Bloomenthal, Blue Sky Regulation and the Theory of Overkill, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 
1447, 1464-67 (1969); Goodkind, supra note 26, at 90-93; Hueni, supra note 6, at 
1423-28; Tyler, supra note 4, at 912-13. 
66. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 409.305(f)(1) (1978); 64 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 207.071, 
reprinted in 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 48,468 (Jan. 1982); WIS. ADMIN. CODE 
§ SEC 3.04, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 64,524 (Dec. 1983). 
67. NASAA Statement of Policy on Cheap Stock, I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~~ 
5312-5314 (Apr. 23, 1983). 
68.1d 
69. These revised guidelines will be drafted by NASAA's Cheap Stock Committee, 
chaired by R.G. Tucker, Chief Deputy, Montana Securities Division. 
70. For discussion of the change in Illinois, see Sosin & Fein, supra note 5, at 196. 
71. The proposed changes in the Texas law are discussed in Bromberg, Texas Securi-
ties Act, TEX. B.J., Jan. 1983, at 36. 
72. On the Wisconsin developments, see WIS. SEC. BULL., July 1983, at 2-4. 
73. On the Iowa developments, see 15 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 963 (May 20, 
1983). 
74. See Sargent, supra note 8, at 284-85. 
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Some states have acted administratively to narrow their own authority, 
such as Michigan.75 These efforts are the result of substantial uncer-
tainty and skepticism about the premises and efficiency of the merit 
regulatory system. The depth of this uncertainty and skepticism is sug-
gested by the variety of criticisms leveled at merit regulation. 
F or example, it has been argued that market forces should govern 
the sale of securities, and that as long as "full disclosure" is provided, 
no further regulation is necessary or appropriate, particularly the pater-
nalistic regulation implicit in the use of merit standards.76 Some con-
tend that inexperienced or untrained securities examiners and 
administrators lack the expertise needed for intelligent evaluation of 
most offerings.77 It has been argued that the efficient working of the 
market will provide adequate investor protection,78 and that merit reg-
ulation is unnecessary. Similarly, it has been said that the best alloca-
tion of scarce state securities regulatory resources is fighting fraud 
through enforcement, not fighting reams of prospectuses used in offer-
ings in which little if any fraud may be involved.79 The net effect of 
these arguments may lead to the suggestion that the federal disclosure 
system provides adequate protection in public offerings and that state 
review is redundant, except perhaps in the case of wholly intrastate 
offerings.80 
Particular aspects of merit regulation are arguably not only inef-
fective in providing investor protection, but that the merit process goes 
beyond establishing "fairness" and attempts to negotiate the final terms 
of an economic relationship on behalf of one of the parties to the ex-
treme detriment of the other without a legislative mandate to do so. 
Similarly, it may be asserted that application of merit standards under-
cuts the clear legislative intent expressed in the state corporation laws.8! 
Most vehement, perhaps, are the practitioners' complaints that some 
administrators regulate in an irrational manner by attempting to ex-
clude entire categories of offerings,82 by applying personal standards 
75. On the Michigan developments, see id at 283; see also MICH. ADMIN. CODE R. 
451.706.26 (1984), reprinted in lA BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 32,467 (Jan. 1984). 
76. See Bateman, supra note 5, at 781-82. 
77. See Tyler, supra note 4, at 934-35. 
78. See Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 7, at 367-69. 
79. See Bloomenthal, supra note 65, at 1481-85. 
80. Id at 1492-93. 
81. General corporation statutes tend to have a broadly enabling character, allowing 
a basic separation of ownership and control. See generally Werner, Corporation 
Law in Search of its Future, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1611 (1981). To the extent that 
the blue sky laws represent an attempt to impose greater restraints on the possibil-
ity of managerial misconduct and self-dealing behavior associated with that sepa-
ration, they are somewhat inconsistent with the intent of the state corporation 
laws. 
82. See L. Loss & E. COWElT, supra note 3, at 76-77 (because of their substantial 
experience with abusive practices in certain types of highly speculative offerings, 
some administrators may tend to treat all offerings of that type with a negative 
attitude). 
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inconsistent with those imposed by other administrators,83 or by ignor-
ing the requirements of the state administrative procedure acts.84 
One commentator has suggested that merit regulators are ineffec-
tive in protecting investors because the perpetrators of flagrant types of 
fraud simply ignore the registration requirements, and that the devo-
tion of state resources to enforcement would produce a greater degree 
of. investor protection.8s The same commentator has recommended 
that the appropriate focus of efforts to protect public investors is the 
general corporation statute, not the blue sky law, and that the public 
policy concerns of merit regulation would be best served by reform of 
those statutes.86 As if these criticisms are not enough, it has further 
been alleged that merit regulation has an adverse effect upon local em-
ployment opportunities.87 
These criticisms have been debated elsewhere,88 and do not re-
quire reconsideration here. What is needed is some discussion of the 
very practical reasons for the unpopularity of merit regulation. It is 
perhaps fair to state that the current assault on merit regulation has 
been generated by a sense of frustration with the formulation and ap-
plication of merit policy.89 This general sense of frustration has several 
specific sources. 
Possibly the most important source is the inherent difficulty associ-
ated with a regulatory system based on substantive standards of fair-
ness. Fairness is a will-O'-the-wisp, difficult to describe, and impossible 
to define. Certain aspects of fairness appear clear to the extent they are 
stated as statutory requirements, rules, guidelines, or forms, but even 
these pronouncements are subject to interpretation, and not all merit 
policies are stated in these written sources. As with the SEC and other 
83. See Tyler, supra note 4, at 923-26. 
84. There has been very little written on the applicability of state administrative law 
to blue sky law. For an introduction to the problem, see DeYonker, Administra-
tive Enforcement Proceedings, in MICHIGAN SECURITIES REGULATION 221 (C. 
Moscow & H. Makens eds. 1983). 
85. Bloomenthal, supra note 65, at 148l. 
86. Id at 1484. 
87. See Statement of Jack Bailey, Iowa Development Commission, 15 SEC. REG. L. 
REP. (BNA) 1882 (Oct. 7, 1983). The decision to locate in a state is based on 
fundamentals such as the availability of human and material resources, cost of 
building, leasing, or owning facilities, transportation, state tax or workers' benefits 
structure, attractiveness of the community, and the generation of ideas that give 
rise to the business opportunity. Financing is an element to consider, but the blue 
sky laws have never been a decisive factor in my experience or those of the attor-
neys whom I have queried. This argument has been raised in states where merit 
regulation has been under recent attack as the basis for excluding certain "high 
tech" companies from developing in those states. A far more likely scenario is 
that those states do not have an existing industrial base or a strong program of 
research in their universities that are the bases for development of that type of 
company, and these factors, combined with the elements for a location decision, 
determine where high tech companies spring forth. 
88. See, e.g., Hueni, supra note 6; Tyler, supra note 4. 
89. For another version of this argument, see Sargent, supra note 8, at 279-80. 
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regulatory agencies, policy is defined, interpreted, and debated in a va-
riety of contexts, including speeches by administrators, agency releases, 
administrative proceedings and litigation, professional articles, and by 
practitioners themselves.90 Merit regulation also falls short of absolute 
definition because it must respond to the facts of each particular offer-
ing. In addition, new forms of compensation, new products, new in-
dustries, new types of securities, and new approaches to regulation at 
the federal level all preclude development of a truly and perennially 
complete set of merit requirements. Written regulation invariably lags 
behind changes in an industry, regardless of the type of change. For it 
to be otherwise, administrators would need a crystal ball or would have 
to be willing and able to stifle business change and development. 
It is thus difficult to state all merit requirements as administrative 
rules. Merit regulation is the imposition of arbitrary fairness standards 
to a securities offering. All regulation is arbitrary to some extent, but 
merit regulation is more so since it is often applied at the sole discretion 
of a single individual on an ad hoc basis. This inherent problem has 
produced much frustration among securities practitioners and has 
helped generate the current assault upon merit regulation. This prob-
lem has been exacerbated by the failure of some states to attempt any 
meaningful merit rulemaking.91 Whether an administrator's excuses 
are an overburdened staff or other priorities, the failure to express es-
tablished policy in some written form is costly to issuers in these states 
and to those involved in interstate offerings seeking to comply with the 
tremendous diversity of state laws. 
Another source of frustration is what administrators refer to as the 
"smell" test.92 If something about the offering strikes the administrator 
as illogical or improper, the administrator typically will make a much 
closer inspection of the offering. These expanded inquiries frequently 
are made with good cause because experienced administrators are 
quick to spot disclosures that appear to disguise more than they reveal 
or to camouflage problems with omissions. Discovery of underlying 
problems will then lead to rigorous application of the specific merit 
requirements. The administrator's decision to inspect more closely a 
particular offering, however, may appear arbitrary to the persons in-
volved in that offering. 
90. For discussion on the research tools useful for reaching these different sources of 
blue sky law, see Sargent & Greenberg, Research in Securities Regulation: Access 
to the Sources of the Law, 75 L. LIBR. J. 98, 105-09, 119-20 (1982). 
91. A review of the BLUE SKY LAW REPORTER (CCH) will show that a fair number of 
merit states have failed to adopt detailed merit regulations. See BLUE SKY L. 
REP. (CCH) (4 vols.). Experienced blue sky practitioners will report, however, 
that these states might apply one or more sets of very detailed NASAA guidelines 
on a purely informal basis. 
92. See L. Loss & E. COWETT, supra note 3, at 77 ("[A] midwestern administrator 
replied that he looked on uranium issues with a 'jaundiced eye' and tended to 
disapprove them 'unless they are of such a nature that we might be tempted to 
invest our own money in them' "). 
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Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of merit regulation to many 
practitioners is the demonstration of prejudice by the administrator 
with respect to certain types of offerings.93 Blanket disapproval of a 
particular industry or method of doing business is rarely justified and 
tends to bring the entire merit regulatory system into disrepute. Merit 
regulation is not intended to provide this type of power and its exercise 
in this manner is a gross abuse of discretion. 
The problems with imprecise standards, the smell test, and admin-
istrator prejudice are compounded by the "echo effect." The echo ef-
fect can often be observed during a national offering, and it can cause 
an issuer problems with clearance. It works quite simply. First, one 
state will make a somewhat unusual merit comment. That comment is 
then circulated in an informal network among state administrators. 
Just as the issuer resolves the comment with the first administrator, an 
echo of the comment is heard in some other state. Since that second 
state may have a different approach to the problem than the first state, 
the issuer may find itself negotiating a different solution to the same 
problem. 
These problems are also compounded by uncertainty over whether 
a given state is a "merit" state94 or whether a merit state will choose to 
exercise its merit powers in a particular case. The phrase merit regula-
tion is bandied about as though it had a very solid and identifiable 
form. It is far more amorphous than that. Some states possessing merit 
powers will apply them only occasionally, either ignoring all but a few 
offerings or relying almost exclusively on clearance in the "tough" 
states as a basis for signoff on an offering. Frequently counsel hears, 
"Have you cleared X state?" If he has, prompt clearance is often forth-
coming in the second state. The rigorous merit states number no more 
than a dozen at any time,95 and the composition of the group may vary 
according to whether the administrator is young, inexperienced, or 
tempered by experience.96 This variation in administration seems un-
fair to issuers, but the variation is usually little worse than that incident 
to drawing a difficult branch chief or examiner at the SEC or the differ-
ence between bringing a complaint to the Justice Department or the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) during the Carter or Reagan admin-
93. See Bloomenthal, supra note 65, at 1492; see also NASAA Uniform Limited Offer-
ing Exemption, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5294 n.l (Sept. 21, 1983) (expressing 
NASAA's suspicion of tax shelter offerings). 
94. For discussion of this question in Massachusetts, see Honig, Massachusetts Securi-
ties Regulation: In Search of the Fulcrum, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 469, 474-76 (1984). 
95. Those states as of this writing are probably Arizona, California, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin. On the phe-
nomenon of leaders and followers, see Gray, Blue Sky Practice-A Morass?, 15 
WAYNE L. REV. 1519, 1529-30 (1969). 
96. See id at 1522 (discussing variations in experience and attitude among state 
administrators). 
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istrations. It does not make the result equitable, but no one has ever 
claimed that government is totally fair, just, and equitable. 
While all of the problems discussed above have generated resent-
ment of merit regulation, there are perhaps three principal causes for 
. the present challenges to merit regulation.97 The first is an administra-
tor's rigid adherence to specific standards 'or policies when the offering, 
taken as a whole, is beneficial to investors. A real estate program that 
meets the guidelines, but has a marginal general partner, will in some 
states clear more easily than one with a financially strong and highly 
reputable general partner who has designed his program out of compli-
ance with one relatively unimportant aspect of the guidelines. The of-
fering with the marginal general partner is probably far more risky to 
the investor than the offering with the substantial general partner, but 
that distinction makes little difference to those administrators who rig-
idly adhere to the letter of the guidelines without regard to the overall 
merit of the offering. The administrator who permits an offering to 
clear without strict compliance with the guidelines may be embarrassed 
if the program fails, but he should be willing to take that risk, recogniz-
ing that the possible reward to investors and business in general out-
weighs the potential threat to the investor. Widespread adoption of 
this balanced attitude would also help dispel the impression that merit 
regulators do not understand the transactions they are trying to regu-
late. A refusal to follow this approach, however, produces understand-
able resentment. 
The second principal cause derives from the personal behavior of 
a few administrators and their staffs. The perception that attorneys and 
their clients have of state regulation is largely shaped by the manner in 
which they are treated by staff examiners. Attorneys who deal with 
examiners should do so in a professional manner. It is reasonable to 
expect that the same professional courtesy will be extended by the ex-
aminers and the rest of the staff. In my.experience and that of other 
securities practitioners, inexperienced or overly aggressive examiners 
have sometimes failed to act in a professional manner. When that hap-
pens, and particularly when it happens on a regular basis, the reputa-
tion of that examining state is damaged nationally because the 
examiner deals with so many attorneys. The examiner who insults an 
attorney, questions his integrity, refuses to return telephone calls, or is 
overly aggressive on the telephone brings discredit to the entire 
NASAA organization and to each of the many administrators and ex-
aminers who conduct themselves in a professional manner. It is ex-
traordinary to hear of this problem at the SEC, and NASAA should be 
able to make the same boast. This negative perception, brought about 
by the conduct of a few, is fueling the fires for reasons unrelated to the 
97. For a survey of the legislative results of the challenges, see Sargent, supra note 8, 
at 282-85. 
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underlying value of merit regulation.98 
The third principal cause is a tendency toward strained state inter-
pretations of the law in a manner contrary to published NASAA guide-
lines. This behavior may place a single state at odds with the rest of the 
country, producing unnecessary delays in clearance, as well as under-
mining NASAA's efforts to produce uniformity. The non-uniform ac-
tions of a leading merit jurisdiction can have a disproportionate impact 
on many states and generate even more resentment of merit regulation. 
Although the resentment created by these problems is understand-
able, they do not justify elimination of merit regulation. These 
problems indicate the need for greater discipline, professionalism, and 
coordination among NASAA members. The possible solutions to these 
problems are complex and will be considered in greater detail below. 
Progress will require vastly improved training of new state administra-
tors and examiners, development of better communications systems 
among the states, improvement in the drafting and the interpretation of 
written merit standards expressed in NASAA guidelines or through 
state rules, growth in the administrators' awareness of the public opin-
ion of their regulatory systems, expansion of the administrative policy-
making procedure to include local professionals and other citizens, and 
removal of those administrators or staff members who refuse to operate 
within the norms of the system. Only progress in these directions will 
alleviate the practical problems that have produced so much hostility 
and misunderstanding. 
IV. THE QUANTITATIVE STUDIES OF MERIT 
REGULATION: ONLY PART OF THE PICTURE 
Despite the theoretical debate over merit standards, all recent ef-
forts to determine the value of merit regulation through quantitative 
analysis have been notably unsuccessfu1.99 The authors of these studies 
have been like the four blind men who were taken to different parts of 
the elephant and asked to describe what the elephant looked like. One 
98. For a discussion of the kind of problems generated by the perception ofunprofes-
sionalism, see Securities Industries Association, SEC-NA SAA Hearings on Federal-
State Securities Regulation, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 12, 1983) (statement of Ste-
phen Bloomenthal, transcript at 12) (copy on file at the University of Baltimore 
Law Review office) [hereinafter cited as Statement of Stephen Bloomenthal]. 
99. The studies to be discussed in this article are: Goodkind, supra note 26, at 107-23; 
Kudla & Jennings, An Evaluation oj the .EJlicacy oj Merit Review by Arizona's Se-
curities Division (June 30, 1983) (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file at the Uni-
versity of Baltimore Law Review office); Walker & Hadaway, Merit Standards 
Revisited: An Empirical Analysis oj the Efficiency of Texas Merit Standards, 7 J. 
CORP. L. 651 (1982). In addition, the FTC in early 1984 solicited comments on a 
proposed FTC sponsored quantitative analysis of merit regulation. See Comment 
Letter from Robert J. Millstone, ABA State Regulation of Securities Committee, 
to Don Arbuckle, FTC Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (Mar. 13, 
1984) (copy on file at the University of Baltimore Law Review office) [hereinafter 
cited as ABA-FTC Comment Letter]. 
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described the trunk, another the tail, another a foot, and the last a side, 
but none understood or described an entire elephant. The merit regu-
lation studies in question compared only the performance of issuers 
whose offerings have cleared a state against those whose offerings were 
denied. This approach is fundamentally flawed because it does not 
measure the major effect of merit regulation: voluntary compliance 
with merit standards. The studies tell us nothing about how wide-
spread this type of voluntary compliance may be or how it is affected 
by changes in merit policy. Similarly, this approach does not measure 
a major effect of merit regulation until months or years after the com-
pletion of the offering, when investors seek to use the safeguards 
against mismanagement, fraud, or incompetence mandated by merit 
regulation. 1°O Furthermore, this approach cannot gauge the impact of 
merit standards that subsequently become adopted as industry stan-
dards. By missing all of these vital issues, the existing quantitative 
studies prove very little. 
The oldest published quantitative study of merit regulation is 
Goodkind's 1976 analysis of the operation of Wisconsin merit stan-
dards.101 The principal feature of Goodkind's article is the analysis of 
seven principal factors that are applied in determining the fairness of 
corporate offerings. His explanation of the underlying rationales, an 
exposition of the advantages and disadvantages of the merit approach, 
is excellent. Goodkind's quantitative analysis is a statistical compari-
son of the performance of corporate issuers whose offerings were regis-
tered or withdrawn in Wisconsin over the four year period 1968-
1971.102 Goodkind used three indices of performance to compare the 
two classes of issuers: price, book value, and dividend distribution. 103 
Although noting several qualifications to his conclusions, Goodkind's 
net determination was that the Wisconsin merit standards resulted in 
the exclusion from Wisconsin markets of offerings presenting a risk of 
severe investment loss. His study thus established a prima facie case 
100. See, e.g., NASAA Oil and Gas, supra note 41, at Section VIII; NASAA Real Es-
tate, supra note 47, at Sections VII, IX.A, ~~ 5358, 5359A. 
101. Goodkind, supra note 26, at 107-23. 
102. Withdrawal may be caused by adverse comments from the administrator, but it 
also may be triggered by successful completion of sales of the securities in other 
states while waiting to resolve conflicts in the states from which withdrawal is 
eventually made. Withdrawal may also occur because of conditions totally unre-
lated to blue sky regulation, including a change in market conditions, the occur-
rence of adverse events affecting the issuer, underwriting difficulties, or national 
events unrelated directly to the field of securities or the issuer. Measurement of 
the blue sky law impact on companies that have withdrawn issues from states is 
difficult, unless one is able to isolate those issuers who have successfully marketed 
their securities, but failed to register in certain states. Even then obtaining infor-
mation as to the underlying cause of nonregistration is exceptionally difficult. 
103. Goodkind, supra note 26, at 108. Goodkind also gathered data on business fail-
ures, finding that 23.5% of the non-clearing issuers were failures (defined as a loss 
of more than 75% of the market value of their stock) after three years. Id. at 121. 
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for maintaining those registration standards in place. 104 
Goodkind's study has been criticized both for its methodology 105 
and its failure to quantify the costs of merit regulation. 106 The princi-
pal limitation of the research is its evaluation of only a single aspect of 
merit regulation: merit review of corporate equity offerings. His con-
clusions are most helpful with respect to that aspect of the regulatory 
scheme, but are of limited usefulness to an evaluation of the overall 
impact of merit regulation. 
A 1982 study of the efficacy of Texas merit standards by Walker 
and Hadaway 107 had a similarly narrow focus. The Texas study com-
pared corporate issuers that withdrew their application for registration 
of common stock with a selected set of companies whose stock was 
cleared for sale in Texas between 1975-1980.108 By limiting their re-
view to corporate offerings, Walker and Hadaway focused on only a 
small percentage of the offerings filed in and subject to merit review by 
the Texas Securities Board. Although this study concluded that merit 
review as a whole is producing its intended result of "equiponderating 
the positions of the new and existing investors,"I09 it is impossible to 
reach a general policy determination on the basis of this evidence with-
out a review of the performance of partnership as well as corporate 
issues. In short, the Texas study provides additional information on 
104. Id at 111-12. Goodkind concluded that: 
Those [rules] limiting offering price, options and warrants, and un-
derwriting commissions and expenses proved especially effective, as did 
those requiring earnings sufficient to cover interest and dividend obliga-
tions, and requiring a minimum promoters' investment. In addition, the 
data indicate that the Commissioner's discretionary authority has been 
quite effectively utilized for the protection of Wisconsin investors, and 
support the rule dealing with cheap stock. . . . 
For those who have attacked the rules as unnecessary restrictions on 
free enterprise and unwarranted limitations on promoters' profits, the 
results provide a convincing rebuttal. 
Id at 123. Goodkind qualified this conclusion, however, by emphasizing that: 
Id 
[T]he aggregate results produced by the study concealed tremen-
dous internal variations. Hidden by the averages set forth herein are 
many issuers whose performance was exceptionally good despite their 
inability to obtain registration in Wisconsin, and some registrants which 
failed miserably. The range for both groups is large enough to suggest 
that the present rules, even though empirically justifiable, leave room for 
improvement. 
105. Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 7, at 376 ("The Wisconsin study is so methodologi-
cally flawed that it yields no useful information on the very interesting problem it 
posed"). Mofsky & Tollison's conclusion does not do credit to the study that was 
the pioneering constructive effort to evaluate merit regulation. 
106. Id at 370-71. Mofsky & Tollison offer little on this issue with their simplistic 
understanding of "cost" and omission of benefit. 
107. Walker & Hadaway, supra note 99. 
108. Id at 659-62. 
109. Id at 680. 
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one narrow facet of merit regulation, but contributes only a limited 
amount to the understanding of the overall picture. 
The more recent attempts at quantitative analysis have contributed 
virtually nothing to an appreciation of the effectiveness of merit regula-
tion. An uncompleted study of the effects of state merit regulation by 
the FTC, begun in 1984, had the same narrow focus as the Wisconsin 
and Texas studies--corporate equity offerings-and therefore could 
not provide a meaningful evaluation of the overall value of merit regu-
lation. 11O The FTC proposal was criticized extensively by both 
NASAA and the ABA's State Regulation of Securities Committee of 
the Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law for this and 
other problems with the study design. III 
A 1983 study by Kudla and Jennings of the Arizona registration 
process I 12 appears to be an unsuccessful attempt to provide support for 
a presumptionll3 that merit regulation should be abolished. The au-
thors attempted to compare the performance of issuers of registered 
and withdrawn offerings, 114 but it is difficult to attach any significance 
to their conclusions since they received a very poor response to their 
questionnaire. I 15 Especially questionable is the authors' conclusion 
that the merit system discriminates against small issuers and thereby 
ItO. The FTC described its project in "Supporting Statement for a Survey to Assess 
State Registrations of Common Stock Securities Issued in 1976 and 1979" (un-
published manuscript) (copy on file at the University of Baltimore Law Review 
office). 
Ill. See Comment Letter from Michael J. Unger, NASAA President, to Don 
Arbuckle, FTC Office ofInformation and Regulatory Affairs, Feb. 13, 1984 (copy 
on file at the University of Baltimore Law Review office). The ABA's criticisms 
were set forth in the ABA-FTC Comment Letter, supra note 99. That letter con-
cluded that the: 
FTC's proposed survey is not an appropriate mechanism for eliciting 
meaningful analysis of state merit regulation of securities. Problems re-
sulting from the narrow scope of the survey, design of questions, inade-
quate access to securities law expertise and limited data source will 
restrict the usefulness of the data produced and make it difficult to 
extrapolate. 
Id at 4. 
112. See Kudla & Jennings, supra note 99. 
1l3. See Letter of Marianne Jennings and Ron Kudla to Governor Bruce Babbit of 
Arizona (June 30, 1983) (copy on file at the University of Baltimore Law Review 
office). 
114. Kudla & Jennings, supra note 99, at 14-18. Highly speculative or otherwise ques-
tionable offerings from a merit perspective may be registered in some states de-
spite adverse comment from the administrator, based on a combination of 
emphasized or expanded disclosure of the adverse information and an increase in 
the suitability requirements for investors. These offerings are lumped in the stud-
ies into the list of offerings that have cleared a state, and are used to show that 
merit regulation was not effective in particular instances, when in fact the merit 
regulatory screen was applied to limit the investors to those who desire to make a 
speculative investment and could afford to gamble with their investment funds. 
115. The authors report that 350 survey questionnaires were mailed to issuers whose 
performance was to be studied. Only 64 were returned with the requested data; 89 
were returned without data; and 197 did not respond. Id at Exhibit 3. 
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acts as a barrier to the free enterprise system, because their conclusion 
rests on the fact that the approved companies typically had larger total 
assets than withdrawn issuers.116 In short, the authors' conclusions are 
unsupported by meaningful quantitative data, and thus cannot be con-
sidered a serious evaluation of the efficiency of the merit process. 
V. A NEW APPROACH TO MERIT REGULATION 
A. The Need/or Merit Regulation 
This article has argued that both the advocates and opponents of 
merit regulation have failed to provide the analysis and data needed for 
a policy decision about the efficacy of merit regulation. Today, how-
ever, some state legislatures 117 are reevaluating the merit system and 
are doing so on the basis of emotional arguments about how well the 
system does or does not work. Something more is needed. In particu-
lar, some very basic data about the actual operation of merit regulation 
is needed. No one knows what percentage of offerings receive merit 
comments on initial review or what response is made to those com-
ments. liB The extent to which those comments are implemented, ex-
plained, or turned into the basis for denial or withdrawal is unknown. 
More importantly, perhaps, it is uncertain which of the comments are 
of significant benefit to investors and which represent the mere triumph 
of form over substance and consequently induce frustration, skepti-
cism, and resentment. All of these data will be needed if one is to an-
swer fully the fundamental question of social policy: Who needs merit 
regulation? In the absence of these data, however, certain basic obser-
vations can be made. 
The opponents of merit regulation can marshal philosophical ar-
guments and provide specific examples of the failure of merit review as 
to particular issues, but they have not yet produced any strong basis for 
the claim that the merit system produces more social costs than social 
benefits. No regulatory system works perfectly, and the suggestion that 
a few failures destroy the value of the system is as ridiculous as sug-
gesting that merit regulation is justified by the existence of a few 
frauds. An evaluation of merit regulation cannot be made on the basis 
116. Id at 17. The authors found that approved companies had a greater average asset 
figure ($76,878,550) than withdrawing companies ($28,788,706). On the basis of 
these fi~ures, which merely suggest that larger and more seasoned issuers have an 
easier hme complying with merit regulation than new issuers, the authors leap to 
the conclusion that "the merit review process discriminates against small issuers. 
The effect of the merit review is to impede economic progress and business devel-
opment by preventing small, capital-short businesses from raising capital in the 
marketplace. The merit standards thus can create barriers to a free enterprise 
system." Id 
117. See Sargent, supra note 8, at 282-85. 
118. It may not be possible to distinguish systematically between "merit" and "disclo-
sure" comments, since the latter are often based on the need for fuller discussion 
of aspects of the transaction that generate merit problems. 
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of isolated instances on either side of the equation. As demonstrated 
above, the existing quantitative studies have failed to make a conclu-
sive or even meaningful contribution to an understanding of merit reg-
ulation. Before another study is attempted, the nature of merit 
regulation as a whole must be understood, and its value must be de-
fined in terms of relative costs and benefits. 
Cost must be measured not only in economic terms but in human 
terms as well. It must reflect not only the additional burden of regula-
tion but also the burden that the regulation relieves. If the result of 
merit regulation is that fewer failures occur or that investor confidence 
is higher so that investments are more attractive in the market, then one 
must counterbalance the loss of opportunity to go to market for a few 
firms, the modification of offering terms for others and the direct costs 
of compliance with the ease of capital formation that is provided for 
issues that possess meritorious characteristics, the reduction of enforce-
ment problems, the improvement of competition, and the monetary 
benefit to investors. 
The direct costs of merit regulation are obvious: filing fees, attor-
ney's fees for blue sky work, and mailing expenses. In my experience, 
these costs represent a miniscule percentage of the money raised and 
are not in themselves a sufficient basis for challenging merit regulation 
or blue sky regulation in its entirety.119 If merit regulation has value, 
these limited costs are de minimis, and most of them would be present 
unless all aspects of the blue sky laws were preempted. In any event, 
the amount of time and money devoted to compliance with federal dis-
closure and accounting requirements far exceed these direct blue sky 
costS.120 Furthermore, the compliance costs associated with merit regu-
lation are similar to those generated by other forms of regulation. 
Thus, these inherent regulatory costs must be accounted for and dis-
counted when the costs specific to merit regulation are calculated. 
The most significant cost of merit regulation is perhaps that of 
time. 121 Clearance with multiple states may take several weeks because 
some states are faced with substantial backlogs. Because time is often 
of the essence for first-time corporate issuers and for real estate or other 
programs requiring the purchase of specific properties, these delays 
may be very costly. This factor is difficult to quantify but it is a perva-
sive concern of issuers and their counsel. 
A second major cost is more elusive. This is the expense to busi-
119. For a discussion on the question of direct blue sky compliance costs, see Tyler, 
supra note 4, at 932 (arguing that though he could not locate data on these costs, 
they should be quantifiable); if. J. MOFSKY, supra note 5, at 31-32 (state registra-
tion involves "considerable cost"); Bateman, supra note 5, at 773 (merit regulation 
"creates a pointless degree of confusion, paperwork and uncertainty"). 
120. See Schneider, Manko & Kant, Going Public: Practice, Procedures and Conse-
quences, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1,27-33 (1981) (discussing compliance costs with federal 
disclosure and accounting requirements). 
121. See Bartell, supra note 32, at 325-26 (discussing methods to avoid blue sky delays). 
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ness created by the need to restructure an offering to comply with merit 
guidelines. This kind of forced restructuring happens frequently, but it 
is not clear whether or to what extent this possibility actually "kills" 
potential public offerings. Because it is difficult to quantify these costs, 
policy makers should exercise caution before concluding that this cost 
of merit regulation outweighs its benefits to society. 
Against these costs must be weighed the benefits of merit regula-
tion. The central benefit, of course, is investor protection. A simple 
reference to the concept of "investor protection" is misleading since 
there are multiple categories of investors who require differing amounts 
of protection. For example, the Uniform Act exempts from registration 
certain offerings made to institutional investors.122 Some states have 
special exemptions for sales to certain wealthy investors,123 or have im-
plemented the accredited investor concept through the adoption of the 
ULOE. These exemptions and exclusions reflect a recognition that 
there are classes or persons whose need for protection varies substan-
tially from that of the average investor. These investors are sophisti-
cated, experienced, or able to hire professional advisers and advocates, 
and are therefore presumed capable of judging fairness. 124 The federal 
and state regulatory schemes are moving toward allowing unlimited 
offers and sales to these persons in private offerings. 125 Although a few 
years away from that ultimate conclusion, it appears to be a logical and 
likely extension of current regulatory philosophy.126 If the wealthy or 
sophisticated investor does not require the protection of regulatory re-
view in connection with a private offering, he may not need it in con-
nection with public offerings. 
Many individual investors do not meet wealth and sophistication 
suitability criteria and, as a consequence, cannot use the exemptions 
that depend upon the character of the investor. They will still be able 
to avoid the effects of merit regulation, however, if they purchase secur-
ities that are themselves exempt. 127 Some securities are exempted from 
registration because of various market or jurisdictional considerations 
122. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(a)(8), 7A U.L.A. 639 (1978 & Supp. 1984). 
123. See, e.g., MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 451.802(b)(9)(D)(5) (West 1983); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 551.23(7) (West 1976). 
124. NASAA Uniform Limited Offering Exemption, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 
5294 (Sept. 21, 1983) (accredited investors are persons deemed not to need the 
benefits of securities registration because they meet certain objective criteria indic-
ative of sophistication and risk-bearing ability). 
125. See Kripke, Has the SEC Taken All the Deadwood Out of its Disclosure System?, 
39 Bus. LAW. 833, 836-39 (1983). 
126. Id.; see also Warren, A Review of Regulation D: The Present Exemption Regimen 
for Limited Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 355, 368 
n.84 (1984) (development of the accredited investor concept in the federal exemp-
tion scheme). 
127. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(a)(I)-(II), 7A U.L.A. 638-40 (1978 & Supp. 1984) (listing 
exempt securities). 
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or because the securities are sufficiently regulated by other agencies. 128 
For example, the Uniform Act provides an exemption for securities 
listed on the New York and American Stock Exchanges, both of which 
are effective self-regulatory organizations. 129 Similarly, government se-
curities,130 securities issued by nonprofit entities, 13 1 and commercial pa-
perl32 are excluded because of the nature of the underlying security or 
the existence of a special relationship affecting the purchase of these 
securities. Finally, securities issued by financial institutions,133 utili-
ties,134 and common carriers135 are exempted because of the supervi-
sion of other government agencies that provide a level of merit 
regulation. 
The need for merit regulation arises in the context of public offer-
ings of non-exempt securities. Many individual investors are neither 
informed nor sophisticated about securities offered in that manner. 
Furthermore, these investors have no intrinsic negotiating power. They 
may collectively decide not to purchase a particular issue, but investors 
do very little else collectively because there is no mechanism through 
which they can share information to formulate decisions. If an invest-
ment fails, furthermore, they have almost no r~course because the cost 
of securities litigation is so great that it is useless for investors who have 
lost less than a very substantial amount or who are unable or unwilling 
to become part of a class action. 
The people who sell securities may even be less experienced than 
the public investors, and often cannot or will not offer any guidance to 
them. The market itself provides little information helpful to these in-
vestors, particularly with respect to initial public offerings. 136 The pub-
lic investor lacks a practical means of acquiring prospectuses of 
competing offerings for purposes of comparison; indeed, it is unlikely 
that he would take the time to acquire them even if they were readily 
available. Furthermore, the public investor lacks the information and 
experience needed to compare different types of offerings. The typical 
level of information and.sophistication applied to purchases of new se-
128. For analysis of the Vniform Act's treatment of exempt securities, see generally J. 
LONG, 1984 BLUE SKY LAW HANDBOOK (1983) (surveying each of the Vniform 
Act's securities exemptions). 
129. VNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(a)(8), 7A V.L.A. 639 (1978). 
130. Id § 402(a)(I)-(2), 7A V.L.A. at 638. 
131. Id § 402(a)(9), 7A V.L.A. at 639-40. 
132. Id § 402(a)(IO), 7A V.L.A. at 640. 
133. Id § 402(a)(3)-(6), 7A V.L.A. at 638-39. 
134. Id § 402(a)(7), 7A V.L.A. at 639. 
135. Id 
136. It cannot be argued seriously that the market operates efficiently with respect to 
initial public offerings. See Makens, supra note 39, at 153; Walker & Hadaway, 
supra note 99, at 658-59. For a discussion on the limitations of the efficient market 
hypothesis, see generally V.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION OF VENTURE CAPITAL MARKETS 26-28 (1980) (efficient 
market hypothesis is a useful means of asserting the effects of securities regulation 
only if inherent testing problems are recognized). 
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curities is thus surprisingly low. The public investor is most likely to 
act on the basis of advice from ~ registered representative, a newspaper 
story about the company or its product, or advice from an acquaintance 
with similar investment interests and a similar lack of information. 
The reputation of the brokerage firm or the particular registered repre-
sentative is often far more important to this kind of investor than any 
available information about the security itself. Brokerage firms thus 
should be advocates of investor protection, but they often fail to fulfill 
this role. In fact, the Securities Industry Association has recently taken 
a position against merit regulation,137 reflecting its primary concern 
with the impact of blue sky regulation on the ability of its members to 
bring products to market. 
The need for merit regulation would be substantially diminished if 
underwriters consistently exercised strong due diligence in conjunction 
with bringing new products to market. Indeed, if adequate due dili-
gence were performed by underwriters then arguably only a small per-
centage of primary offerings would need to be reviewed by the states 
for fairness. It is my impression, however, that the competitive eco-
nomics of the securities business prevents many underwriters from en-
gaging in the type of due diligence review that would make merit 
regulation unnecessary.l38 To obtain underwritings, the underwriter 
frequently must be willing to settle for less than a full measure of inves-
tor's rights. Some underwriters apparently consider those rights unim-
portant. In addition, an underwriter seeking to convince an issuer that 
it should be allowed to handle a public offering has only limited ability 
to compel alteration of the compensation taken by the issuer's promot-
ers or insiders. Only if the issuer operates in a non-competitive market 
for its product can the underwriter impose a substantial level of control 
over compensation and conflicts. 
As a result of these pressures, the underwriter's due diligence effort 
ranges from excellent to inadequate and is, on occasion, completely ab-
sent. This problem is exacerbated by the lack of specific standards for 
due diligence. 139 Proposals for government definition of these stan-
137. See Letter from Michael Kiey, Chairman, Securities Industry Association, State 
Regulation Committee, to George A. Fitzsimmons, Secretary, SEC, in connection 
with SEC-NASAA Hearings on Federal-State Regulation, Washington, D.C. 
(Sept. 9, 1983), at 212-13 (copy on file at the University of Baltimore Law Review 
office) [hereinafter cited as Letter from Michael Kiey]; Statement of Stephen 
Bloomenthal, supra note 98, at 211-43. 
138. For a study of both the practical and legal aspects of the "due diligence" concept 
in connection with securities offerings, see NAT'L Assoc. OF SEC. DEALERS, SPE-
CIAL REPORT, DUE DILIGENCE SEMINARS (July 1981). 
139. No administrative agency, either state or federal, has defined specific standards of 
due diligence. Accordingly, the level of due diligence applied by underwriters, 
accountants, and attorneys to a particular offering is determined largely by their 
willingness to adhere to the unwritten standards generally applied in the industry. 
The level of due diligence thus varies widely, and may reach very low levels in-
deed, especially when smaller, less well-established regional underwriters are in-
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dards have been opposed by the underwriters and the brokerage com-
munity on the ground that specific standards would expose them to 
potential liability in civil litigation. 140 As a regulator, I was continually 
amazed by the number of underwriters and brokerage firms that totally 
failed to explore in their sponsored offerings the nature and amount of 
promoter compensation, the potential conflicts of interest, and the level 
of disclosure about the intended use of the proceeds. If the prospectus 
roughly complies with the SEC's disclosure format, many underwriters 
feel quite comfortable, even though certain obvious facts may have in-
dicated that additional inquiry should be made. 141 
There are similar market pressures on brokerage firms. If the bro-
kerage firm believes that the issue can be sold in the market, it is un-
likely that it will take any steps to hold the price down for the benefit of 
investors. That is not the nature of the marketplace. Since brokerage 
firms lack an incentive to protect the investor,142 only the regulator can 
protect him against an overpriced or over-hyped issue. 
It is perhaps fair to say that new issues are customarily sold to 
rather than bought by the public investor. This inherent market pres-
sure, when viewed in light of the varieties of competing securities prod-
ucts, the lack of informed and critical analysis of new issues, the 
paucity of information that is provided by most registered representa-
tives to their customers, and the inadequacy of many due diligence re-
views, creates a substantial need for investor protection. Merit 
administrators fulfill the function of asking the questions and seeking 
the underlying information that should have been asked and sought by 
underwriters. 143 That, however, is only part of the blue sky process. 
By applying merit standards, regulators perform the function that 
neither the market, the underwriter, nor the brokerage firm can per-
form on a consistent basis: ensuring fair treatment of the public inves-
tor. By performing these interrelated functions of eliciting material 
volved in the transaction. For discussion of how regional underwriters, rather 
than national underwriters, tend to dominate the initial public offering market, see 
Tyler, supra note 4, "itt 917-18. For a review on the role of underwriting forms in 
highly abusive penny stock offerings, see Barnes, Bad Pennies, Venture, Nov. 
1983, at 38, 44-46. 
140. When Director of the Michigan Corporation and Securities Bureau, I informally 
suggested that the Bureau consider adopting by rule specific due diligence stan-
dards. The response from the industry was decidedly negative. 
141. Merit regulation can perhaps be understood as in part a trade-off for the uncer-
tainty about whether an appropriate level of due diligence will be applied. To the 
extent that an appropriate level of due diligence could be mandated by law, merit 
standards can and should be relaxed. 
142. Brokerage firms may have an incentive to protect the investor to secure his repeat 
business, but certainly not all firms take this view at all times. See Tyler, supra 
note 4, at 919 (discussing the temptation to use hard-sell techniques in connection 
with high-risk initial public offerings). 
143. To the extent that the administrator serves this function, the underwriter, as well 
as the public investor, is benefited. 
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disclosures and regulating the substantive fairness of the offering, the 
merit regulators try to speak for the investor. 
Despite their efforts merit regulators are sometimes accused of at-
tempting to enhance their own power, reputation, or budget at the ex-
pense of the industry and without any corresponding benefit to the 
investor. l44 While this criticism is usually unfair and inaccurate, ad-
ministrators are not without fault. The problem is sometimes one of 
inflexibility. In my experience as both an administrator and private 
practitioner, I have seen some well-intentioned administrators apply 
merit standards in a rigorously mechanical way without considering 
the overall character of the offering. As a consequence, issues will be 
delayed by questions about the offering that have little, if any, rele-
vance to the investor. 
The problem may also be one of perspective. The administrator's 
perspective on an offering may be skewed to the negative side since the 
majority of investors with whom they meet are those who have lost 
money or have been defrauded. As a result of this experience, virtually 
all administrators would agree that it is better to prevent the loss from 
occurring than it is to attempt to recoup the loss later. Accordingly, 
some administrators evince a strong pro-investor bias. Taken to an ex-
treme, this bias can lead to an "overkill" application of merit stan-
dards. 145 These criticisms are valid, and deserve to be taken seriously 
both by NASAA and the individual merit administrators. In my opin-
ion, however, most administrators recognize their inherent bias in favor 
of protecting the investor and attempt to maintain a realistic view of 
the needs of capital formation and the limits of their regulatory 
responsibilities. 
This article has contended that the central benefit of merit regula-
tion is the administrator's attempt to speak on the investor's behalf. In 
this role, the administrator attempts to provide what the marketplace 
and the SEC cannot provide. The merit administrator's good faith at-
tempt to play this role should be preserved. It is obvious that much can 
be done to improve this system through the joint efforts of NASAA, the 
SEC, the bar, and the securities industry. 
-T' 
B. Recommendations 
l. Recommendations for NASAA 
The current level of public criticism of merit regulation indicates 
substantial problems with the merit regulatory system. Some of the 
problems are mechanical. For example, it is inefficient to require that 
144. See, e.g., Securities Industries Association, SEC-NASAA Hearings on Federal-State 
Securities Regulation, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 12, 1983) (statement of Merle W. 
Hopkins & Jerry L. Arnold, transcript of 3-4) (copy on file at the University of 
Baltimore Law Review office); Letter from Michael Kiey, supra note 137, at 6. 
145. See Bloomenthal, supra note 65, at 1493. 
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the same document filed with the SEC also be filed in fifty states. This 
is more than a question of excess paperwork. Multistate filing means 
multistate merit review, with all the potential problems that entails. A 
more efficient means of allocating responsibility for merit review is 
needed. There has been some experimentation in this area. For a pe-
riod of six months in 1977, four states offered issuers the opportunity to 
volunteer for a single regional review of offerings to be made in those 
states. 146 Issuers refused to use the system largely because their attor-
neys were reluctant to abandon the relative certainty of their existing 
relationships with each individual state examiner. 147 The current prob-
lem with multistate filings and multistate reviews is, in part, the result 
of reluctance on the part of the bar and the brokerage community to 
experiment with this system. 
Another major problem has been the failure of the individual 
states to adopt a uniform limited offering exemption compatible with 
Regulation D.148 The current amalgam of inconsistent and inadequate 
state private and limited offering exemptions generates confusion and 
compliance costs without a matching benefit to investors. 149 This prob-
lem has intensified the criticism of merit regulation by forcing transac-
tions exempt on the federal level and exempt in some states into 
registration and merit review in other states. NASAA can help solve 
this problem by vigorously promoting a policy of uniformity among its 
members with respect to exempt transactions. ISO 
An especially troublesome problem is that created by unqualified 
or unprofessional examiners. Both NASAA and the individual states 
should give more attention to training and supervision. This would 
remove one of the major irritants in the present system. 
Another important goal for NASAA should be detailed explana-
tion of the policy decisions expressed in its merit guidelinesY I If 
146. Those states were Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. See H. 
SOWARDS & N. HIRSCH, BLUE SKY REGULATION § 7.01, at 7-3 n.4 (1977). 
147. See SEC, GOVERNMENT-BuSINESS FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FOR-
MATION Part VII, at 13 (1982). 
148. See generally Halloran & Linderman, Coordinating State Securities Laws with 
Regulation D and Federal Integration Policy: State Limited Offering Exemptions 
and Integration Standards, in STATE REGULATION OF CAPITAL FORMATION AND 
SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS 155 (D. Goldwasser & H. Makens eds. 1983) (sub-
stantial disparity among state limited and private offering exemptions persists). 
149. See Sargent, supra note 16, at 502-06. 
150. NASAA has already taken strides in this direction. See NASAA Committee De-
velops ULOE Adoption Chart to Help Promote State Uniformity, 15 SEC. REG. & 
L. REP. (BNA) 2183 (Dec. 2, 1983). 
151. A major flaw in NASAA's adoption procedure for guidelines has been its failure 
to provide detailed explanations of the reasons for the actions proposed in the 
guidelines. SEC releases are usually characterized by a preliminary policy state-
ment. Unfortunately, NASAA guidelines have not contained this information, 
placing commentators at a substantial disadvantage in interpreting the position 
adopted by NASAA. In addition, once adopted the guidelines contain no expla-
nation for the positions that have been assumed. Since many of the decisions are 
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NASAA can clearly explain the overall purpose of the guidelines and 
the specific purposes of their individual provisions, there will be less 
blind application of specific requirements. Examiners can be given 
more flexibility in clearing offerings, and counsel and underwriters 
would be able to draft and negotiate with a better appreciation of the 
guidelines' valid concerns. If NASAA begins to provide this kind of 
careful, clear, and detailed explanation of its guidelines, a coherent phi-
losophy of merit regulation will eventually develop. 
NASAA also needs to take more positive steps toward developing 
uniformity in merit regulation. Many states tend to act in a vacuum 
when they develop their own merit rules or develop inconsistent inter-
pretations of NASAA guidelines. These states tend to ignore the avail-
able means of sharing information. This situation should be remedied 
and it can only be accomplished through greater pressure by NASAA 
on its membership. NASAA should have as its goal "standards in se-
curities regulation that are fair and reasonable and consistently applied 
.... [T]he requirements should not be so burdensome as to unduly 
impede or delay the marketing of those issues that are entitled to be 
sold publicly."152 Achievement of this goal would eliminate much of 
the hostility toward merit regulation. 
2. Recommendations for the SEC 
If merit regulation is a substantial impediment to capital forma-
tion, it is remarkable that the SEC has taken such a low profile in dis-
cussions on the topic. Despite the political reasons for hesitation, the 
time has come for increased SEC participation in this debate. The SEC 
can participate in at least three ways. 
First, the SEC can provide some important data needed for further 
study of the problem. Only the SEC has the data needed to evaluate 
the changes made in filing documents as a result of merit regulation, 
because every public offering is registered with the SEC. Similarly, the 
data regarding the withdrawal from and the avoidance of rigorous 
merit states cannot be provided by any single state because none has all 
of the pertinent data. The SEC and NASAA should consider a joint 
attempt to produce and study these data to assess the impact of merit 
regulation on the offering process. 
Second, the SEC and NASAA need to reconsider the current allo-
cation of regulatory authority. The SEC has clung tenaciously to juris-
diction over small offerings where state regulation would provide 
adequate public protection. 153 Conversely, the states have continued to 
economic rather than legal decisions, it would be of substantial assistance to the 
public to have information far beyond that which NASAA now provides. 
152. Hueni, supra note 6, at 1419-20. 
153. Only Rule 504 of Regulation D (17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1983» shows any real effort 
to defer to state regulation in connection with small offerings. See Securities Act 
Release No. 6339, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 83,014, 
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regulate offerings in connection with which the market's efficient ab-
sorption of publicly available information provides sufficient protec-
tion. 154 A question that has never received detailed consideration is to 
what extent can or should the SEC and NASAA members divide re-
sponsibility for regulation of the different levels of the securities 
markets. 
Third, the SEC and NASAA need to examine the ways in which 
their different regulatory techniques can or should interact. In particu-
lar, a joint SEC-NASAA study of the principal areas of disagreement 
on disclosure and of the extent to which SEC-mandated disclosure can 
address state merit concerns is needed. 
The SEC must recognize the reality and importance of state regu-
lation and take a more active role in its reform. In so doing, it should 
be more attentive to the advice of the state administrators. If the SEC 
had been more receptive to the states' suggestions during the drafting 
of Regulation D,155 the fight for a uniform limited offering exemption 
would have been less bitter. 156 While the Regulation D drafting expe-
rience is not the best model for the SEC's participation in the debate 
over merit regulation, more SEC participation is necessary. In fulfil-
ling its statutory mandate under section 19(c) of the Securities Act of 
1933 to explore with state administrators ways to reduce the cost of 
capital formation,157 the SEC can and should tum its attention to how 
at 84,458 (Aug. 7, 1981); Securities Act Release No. 6389, [1981-1982 Transfer 
Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 83,106, at 84,909 (Mar. 8, 1982); see also 
Sargent, supra note 16. 
154. This problem is reflected in the continuing debate over the extent to which the 
states should apply merit regulation to widely followed issuers not listed on the 
national exchanges. See authorities cited in Sargent, supra note 16, at 500 n.l3. 
ISS. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-506 (1983) (Regulation D provides three separate exemp-
tions from federal securities registration, together with a uniform set of definitions 
and conditions). 
156. NASAA participated to a limited extent with the SEC in the drafting of Regula-
tion D. See Securities Act Release No. 6339, supra note 153, at 84,455; Securities 
Act Release No. 6389, supra note 153, at 84,909-84,910. As originally proposed, 
Regulation D contained provisions reflecting some of NASAA's particular con-
cerns, such as restrictions on remuneration for sales efforts (Securities Act Release 
No. 6339, supra note 153, at 84,464-84,465) and disqualification from eligibility 
for issuers subject to recent actions by state administrators. Id. at 84,468. These 
provisions were deleted from the final version of Regulation D. These changes, 
together with a perception that Regulation D in general represents a refusal to 
heed the state administrators' warning of the need for continued investor protec-
tion in exempt transactions, produced considerable resentment in NASAA and 
have impeded the widespread adoption of a uniform limited offering exemption. 
See Memorandum of NASAA Enforcement Liasion Committee to NASAA Small 
Business Committee, Apr. 19, 1983, at 3 (copy on file at the University of Balti-
more Law Review office). 
157. Section 19(c) of the Securities Act of 1933 (current version at IS U.S.C.A. § 77s(c) 
(West 1982» provides: 
(c)(l) The Commission is authorized to cooperate with any association 
composed of duly constituted representatives of State governments 
whose primary assignment is the regulation of the securities business 
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it can help improve the conception and functioning of merit regulation. 
The SEC's September 1983 joint hearings with NASAA on federal-
state securities regulation were a step in the right direction,158 but more 
must be done. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is time to stop spouting generalities and filling the air with emo-
tional outbursts. If there are problems with merit regulation, they 
should be documented and shared with NASAA so that attempts can 
be made to correct the situation. It is easy to be a critic. It involves 
little effort and often less thought. The critic without positive and real-
istic suggestions adds little to the improvement of the system and de-
serves little attention. 
158. 
The securities industry, in particular, needs to reexamine its posi-
within those States, and which, in the judgment of the Commission, 
could assist in effectuating greater uniformity in Federal-State securities 
matters. The Commission shall, at its discretion, cooperate, coordinate, 
and share information with such an association for the purposes of car-
rying out the policies and projects set forth in paragraphs (2) and (3). 
(2) It is the declared policy of this subsection that there should be 
greater Federal and State cooperation in securities matters, including-
(A) maximum effectiveness of regulation, 
(B) maximum uniformity in Federal and State regulatory 
standards, 
(C) minimum interference with the business of capital forma-
tion, and 
(D) a substantial reduction in costs and paperwork to dimin-
ish the burdens of raising investment capital (particularly by small busi-
ness) and to diminish the costs of the administration of the Government 
programs involved. 
(3) The purpose of this subsection is to engender cooperation be-
tween the Commission, any such association of State securities officials, 
and other duly constituted securities associations in the following areas: 
(A) the sharing of information regarding the registration or 
exemption of securities issues applied for in the various States; 
(B) the development and maintenance of uniform securities 
forms and procedures; and 
(C) the development of a uniform exemption from registra-
tion for small issuers which can be agreed upon among several States or 
between the States and the Federal Government. The Commission shall 
have the authority to adopt such an exemption as agreed upon for Fed-
eral purposes. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed as authorizing 
preemption of State law. 
(4) In order to carry out these policies and purposes, the Commis-
sion shall conduct an annual conference as well as such other meetings 
as are deemed necessary; to which representatives from such securities 
associations, securities self-regulatory organizations, agencies, and pri-
vate organizations involved in capital formation shall be invited to 
participate. 
See SEC & NASAA, SUMMARY REPORT, SEC-NASAA CONFERENCE ON FED-
ERAL STATE SECURITIES REGULATION (1984) [hereinafter cited as SEC & 
NASAA REPORT] (reporting joint hearings and conference on current problems in 
state securities regulation). 
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tion on merit regulation. 159 Because of the brokerage firm's intimate 
relationship with the investor, the firm is perhaps best able to deter-
mine when and how merit regulation benefits the investor. The securi-
ties industry can help identify the specific merit concerns that are of 
significance to the investor and define how due diligence standards are 
affected by merit regulation. It can help one understand how some 
aspects of merit regulation protect investors while others may unneces-
sarily impede capital formation. 160 The objections of the securities in-
dustry to merit regulation will become meaningful only to the extent 
that these questions are addressed. 
The securities bar also needs to do more. In fact, the bar may have 
contributed to the merit "problem" by failing to take the lead in devel-
oping better systems. The credibility of its criticisms has been dimin-
ished by its inability or refusal to provide specific data corroborating 
some of its complaints. This diminished credibility has reinforced 
some administrators' perception that practitioners are merely hired 
guns with no concern for investors. This perception is inaccurate, but it 
is reinforced by those attorneys who posture and threaten in their deal-
ings with administrators rather than present a sound case. If real pro-
gress is to be achieved, the bar must help to reduce the tension and 
mistrust currently associated with the merit regulatory system. 
The bar should function as neither an opponent nor a supporter of 
merit regulation. Its role should be to contribute to a regulatory system 
that works effectively for both investors and for issuers. In the long 
run, a balanced approach will serve the best interest of both groups. 
The organized securities bar has recently taken a step in that direction. 
The ABA's State Regulation of Securities Commission of the Corpora-
tion, Banking, and Business Law Section has designated a subcommit-
tee to study the elements of merit regulation and to consider its 
functioning and effectiveness. 161 NASAA has established a similar 
committee. 162 The opportunity for informed dialogue is here and 
should not be lost. 
159. See sources cited supra note 136 (comments of securities industry representatives); 
see also Myriad 0/ Approaches to Uniformity of State Regulation Urged at Hearing, 
15 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1737, 1738 (Sept. 16, 1983). 
160. See SEC & NASAA REPORT, supra note 158, at 15 (discussing recommendation 
that merit regulation be evaluated in terms of specific effects). 
161. See ABA Suhcommillee to Study Merit Regulation, Allempt Neutral Review, 16 
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 650 (Apr. 13, 1984). 
162. The NASAA committee charged with this study of merit regulation is the 
NASAA White Paper Project Committee, chaired by E.C. Mackey, Director, 
Michigan Corporations and Securities Bureau. Telephone interview with James 
L. Karpen, Committee Member and Director, Enforcement Division, Michigan 
Corporation and Securities Bureau (June 19, 1984). 
